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IAC-D-100/17

20 July 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Validity Studies of:

NIE 63.1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam


to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and

NIE 63.1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam

to July 1956, published 11 October 1955

The attached validity studies of NIE 63.1-55, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956," published 19 July 1955, and NIE 63.1-3-55, "Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956," published 11 October 1955, were noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956 (IAC-M-247, 17 July, item 9 c).

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Secretary

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Validity Studies of:

NIE 63.1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam

to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and

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to July 1956, published 11 October 1955

1. The principal conclusions of NIE 63.1-55 to the effect that the DRV would not invade the South and would be unlikely to resume widespread guerrilla activities in the South prior to the election deadline have proven valid. Estimates that the "DRV will experience no great difficulty in maintaining effective control of North Vietnam" and that "the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV will probably be reduced throughout Vietnam" also appear to be borne out by events. As estimated, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has provided "sufficient economic and technical assistance to meet minimum requirements for stability and control."

2. As estimated, the DRV, while covertly strengthening the Pathet Lao movement, has refrained from launching an attack with its own forces to seize Laos.

3. The estimate has proven correct in its conclusion that, "The Communists now have few assets in Cambodia and will probably be unable to develop a significant internal threat in that country until their position is greatly strengthened in Laos or South Vietnam. In the meantime, the DRV will probably continue its efforts to promote friendly relations and to secure Cambodian neutrality."

4. The principal conclusions of NIE 63.1-3-55 to the effect that Diem would be able to cope with non-Communist dissident elements, make further progress in developing a more effective government, and refuse to hold nationwide elections have generally proven valid. However, progress toward the creation of a new state in South Vietnam over the past year has been somewhat greater than anticipated in NIE 63.1-3-55.

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